Monday, October 20, 2008

Stealth Tax and the Money Tree

[This is a previously unpublished essay written by Sarel Oberholster in November 2004 but the subject matter of Basle accords and capital coefficients were considered not digestible fare for the readers of finance and investment essays. Perhaps this essay deserved to be published as it deals with the very reality that we are facing today. The content of this essay is even more relevant now in October 2008.]

Fractional Banking, the Money Multiplier and money creation by banks are economic concepts that need updating. Failing to do so will expose you to almost limitless taxation by stealth. Nothing is safe, not your income, or your wealth; even your pension is there for the taking.

Fractional banking is a derivative of the money multiplier theory, which works like this. A bank receives a deposit, which can then be recycled and multiplied throughout the banking sector subject to the “fraction” that a bank will or are obliged to retain as a “reserve” against withdrawals. Say the reserve is $10 out of $100, then the 1st deposit-receiving bank can lend out $90, the money recycles in the economy and ends up as a $90 deposit with the next bank who in turn will “reserve” $9 and lend out $81, ad infinitum until the fractions simply gets to small to matter. Not a complicated theory at all, only starting at the wrong place. The very 1st $100 is the only “money” the rest is simply an assumption about credit distribution. The multiplication may or may not happen. Of more importance is that the existence of “reserving” will act as a natural brake on the extent of credit distribution in any economy. This is the first area where updating is required.

The advent of a standardised worldwide approach towards bank supervision as new monetary policy embodied in the Basel Accords (Basel I – the 1988 Capital Accord and Basel II - 2001) have effectively superseded “reserving” as part of monetary policy. You can read up and find these accords at the BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision by following this link http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ . Implementation guidelines for the Basel II accord can be found at this link http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs109.pdf .

These accords changed the focus of credit creation by banks as managed by central banks. All forms of credit and banking risks are graded (“risk weightings”) and banks are required to hold a prescribed percentage of capital against each class of risk. These are called capital co-efficients and banks must then comply with “Capital Adequacy Ratios”. It follows that capital adequacy ratios have taken over from fractional reserving as the limiting variable in credit creation by banks. The size of the reserving “fraction” has become so small such as to all but eliminate it as a brake on credit creation.

The new overarching credit creating policy variables are the Capital Adequacy Ratio from Central Bank Supervision over banks and Liquidity Accommodation to banks. First let’s look at Capital Adequacy.

The Capital Adequacy Ratio for banks under Basel II is generally targeted at 12% by 2005. This simply means that a bank’s capital must equal 12% of the sum of its risk exposures. A simplified example would be that a bank’s Capital Requirement would be $12 if it has advances of $100. It gets a bit more complicated with different “tiers” of capital and the fact that the $12 may also be lent out, but the fundamental principle of the example holds true irrespective. Risk weightings make up the sum of the risk exposures.

The risk weighting for standardised credit risks is 100% (the vast majority of all Bank lending other than residential mortgage lending, lending to government and public sector entities, and lending to other banks). This only means that the full 100% of the $12 shown in the above example will apply.

Special rules of “risk mitigation” apply to certain classes of loans made by banks. Residential mortgage advances of high quality can get risk weighted as low as at 35%. Again a simple process. $100 of these mortgages will get only 35% of the normal $12 Capital Requirement i.e. $4.20, which translates to almost 3 times as much Residential mortgage lending at the original $12 capital. Lending to governments can be as low a risk weighting as zero but normally would not exceed 10% as a risk weighting. That means banks can lend to government 10 times more than to anybody else, as a worst case scenario, but at a zero rating, banks can lend to government an unlimited amount. Hang on to this principle for it is part of a simple circular process to create unlimited government funding via the banking sector, for the Fed will supply the banks with all the “money” they need to advance to borrowers to complete the circle.

Armed with understanding the basics of Capital Adequacy, Risk Weightings and risk mitigation, facilitates understanding of the processes in place to distribute unlimited credit, or better known as unlimited debt. Banks are very capable in managing their capital needs to satisfy the capital adequacy requirements.

Banks do not actually create money. They distribute credit. Their ability to distribute credit used to be a function of the amount of deposits that they could attract. That was the next problem that stood in the way of limitless credit. This problem was solved through central bank “accommodation”, even before the advent of Basel I.

Banks are credit shops; they buy and sell credit. Banks operate on the basic principle of selling all qualifying credit on any given day and then try to balance the books at the end of the day. This they do by attracting deposits. They sell the excess, when deposits exceed their sales of credit, in the inter-bank market. Those banks experiencing a shortfall after exhausting all sources of deposits will access the inter-bank market for deposits. Obtaining a deposit from the central bank makes up a shortfall after exhausting the inter-bank market.

The process involved in obtaining such a deposit is normally described in complex technical language, but it remains just a deposit by the central bank at the bank with a shortfall. It is a structural given in the modern economy, that there will always be a daily shortage of available deposits. The shortage is made up by the central bank in terms of its liquidity policies towards the banks. The central banks would also penalise banks when they make use of this accommodation. Such penalties, hawkish or dovish, would be a function of prevailing monetary policy and will be expressed as an interest rate. Here, however, is the link in the chain; banks would normally need government securities as collateral to obtain accommodation, so banks will tend to hold fair volumes of government debt as “liquidity reserves”.

Think about it. Banks have no idea of exactly how much credit they will grant on any given day or what the level of withdrawals will be. So, a bank will not say, “lets see what deposits amount to for the day?” and then grant loans until the deposits have been used up. Any luckless, would be borrowers, would then have to wait until the next day to know if the bank managed to obtain enough deposits to grant them a loan. It just does not work that way. Banks sell credit first and then balance the books thereafter; there is no other way!

The economic and logical trap that creates the mirage of banks as money alchemists can be found in misinterpreting bank credit and fiat money as the same thing. They’re not. Every bank must balance its books every day. Credit sold must equal the sum of deposits taken, capital and central bank accommodation. It is no more complicated than that from a global perspective. The only money creation in this exercise is the accommodation by the Central Bank.

Here’s a sample from the Bank of Japan accommodation policy, where an “unlimited accommodation” policy has been in place for a long time. Available on the Home Page of the BOJ, by following this link, http://www.boj.or.jp/en/seisaku/04/pb/k041029_f.htm [this link has since been deactivated].

“[Monetary Policy Meetings]

October 29, 2004
Bank of Japan
(For immediate release)
________________________________________
At the Monetary Policy Meeting held today, the Bank of Japan decided, by unanimous vote, to set the following guideline for money market operations for the intermeeting period:
The Bank of Japan will conduct money market operations, aiming at the outstanding balance of current accounts held at the Bank at around 30 to 35 trillion yen.
Should there be a risk of financial market instability, such as a surge in liquidity demand, the Bank will provide more liquidity irrespective of the above target.”

The Central Bank is the only entity that can show a deposit to a bank on one side of its balance sheet and a “money” liability on the other side of its balance sheet. It is of no relevance for money creation how many debits or credits are created in the books of all the banks in the world on any given day. That is simply the turnover of banks. The end of day “accommodation” where central banks balance the books of banks is where the money creation happens. The existence of providers of credit beyond banks, such as Mortgage Lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, Corporate Finance entities such as used by GM and other “in-house banks” and large scale direct investments in securities from junk bonds to high quality mortgage securitisations have made the measurement of “money supply” in M2 and M3 susceptible to gross understatement of the actual “money creation” taking place. Credit derivatives, collateralised debt obligations and other exotic financial instruments, actively used by banks and other financial entities will not even appear on the radar. In the end it is better to follow trends in debt rather than the traditional money supply variables.

Large-scale stimulation of the economy through budget deficits (fiscal stimulation) and quantitative easing (monetary stimulation) would be expected to show up on the balance sheets of commercial banks as an increase in holdings of Government Securities. More so if overnight interest rates for banks are much lower than yields on Government Securities and the Fed promises lower rates for longer (the “carry trade”). It is therefore interesting to observe how holdings of U.S. Government Securities at all Commercial Banks [1] increased since the 1st quarter of 2001 with the recorded growth rate at 5.52% in Feb 2004 the highest growth rate in this series from its inception in Jan 1947. Observing this increase against the advent of the downturn in equities and subsequent recovery is most illuminating. The down trends in both Commercial Bank holdings of Government Securities and the DJIA may just be a very ominous signal. Note also a similar down tendency early in the first bear phase of the DJIA.





The explosive growth in purchases by banks of Government Securities is consistent with similar increases in the budget deficit, the trade deficit, mortgage debt, in fact almost all types of debt, all of which manifested in an equally stimulated aggregate demand, creating an illusion of a healthy growing economy.

The money tree belongs to the Central Banks and only them. They guard this power jealously. Banks cannot create money; they can only function as the conduit for the Central Bank’s credit stimulation policies, which in turn is derived from monetary policy as expressed by government. Ultimately all other financial intermediaries’ actions will be captured in the central bank accommodation provided to the banks. Knowing also that central banks can actually provide unlimited accommodation and banks just need to ensure capital adequacy, leads to understanding how an economy can be stimulated with unrelenting quantitative easing at any level of interest rates. Add to this the arrival of all new forms of electronic banking and internet banking, facilitating the distribution of credit in almost real time and you will get an idea of how efficient and dangerous debt stimulation has become. Finally add the fact that the Basel accords are being implemented right now all over the world, duplicating the quantitative easing/liquidity accommodation circle like an internet virus in every nook and canny of the world and then decide for yourself how concerned you should be.

Stealth tax is the name of every turn of the circle between quantitative easing and liquidity accommodation, stealth tax on your assets, stealth tax on your future income and even stealth tax on your children’s income and their children’s income. The “debt ceiling” of $7.4 trillion must be raised urgently, a couple more turns of the circle and US Congress will be asked to raise it again, and again, and again …

Sarel Oberholster
BCom (Cum Laude), CAIB (SA).
8 November 2004
E-mail – ccpt@iafrica.com

[1] Series USGSEC. Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

5 comments:

Anonymous said...

Dear Sarel,

I have recently read your "Beware 29th December" and "When Debt Comes Calling" articles. They are excellent articles and I should thank you for making clear explanations about debt creation-destruction process.

I do have several questions, which if you don't mind you would explain in more detail. So, from your essay, it can be concluded that the endgame of an exponential debt creation & debt saturation are either a deflationary spiral (Japan & 1929 case) and hyperinflationary depression (Weimar Germany). And according to your essay, the 2 quite opposite paths are determined by the nature of intervention: if debt-paying just involves printing more paper money, it will lead to hyperinflation and if it is channeled through debt, it will end up like Japan.

My questions are:
1. What makes channeling the debt collapse through debt creation -- deflationary? Is it that the debt destruction in the private sector massively outpacing the debt creation (mainly by government)?

2. In Japan, the deflationary spiral is still going. Is this because the government spending is creating more malinvestment and that malinvestment is being liquidated -- hence deflation? The US government under Obama will try similar measures. Do you expect same outcome?

3. Japan had the advantage of high savings rate and boom period in other parts of the world when their credit bust occurred. In light of that, with the present world essentially heavy in debt (including China, who is said to have high savings-rate, although in reality it's printing RMB for incoming USD), what will likely happen, in your view?

4. It looks like the present policy of major economy governments are to devalue their own currencies ("beggar thy neighbor" tactics). What will likely happen? Could the hyperinflationary measure be finally explored? Who has the advantage in this game?

5. Finally.. gold. I feel that the sentiment is too bullish on gold for now for it to be really bullish. I think LT govt bonds (so far still despised) will perform better. Do you agree?

That is all my questions for now. I apologize if the questions are too lengthy. I hope that you can discuss them because they are essential to our outlooks in several years to come.

Thank you for your help & for having been so enlightening.


Best regards,
Roger Jarema

Sarel Oberholster said...

Roger Jarema has left a new comment on your post "Stealth Tax and the Money Tree":

Dear Sarel,

I have recently read your "Beware 29th December" and "When Debt Comes Calling" articles. They are excellent articles and I should thank you for making clear explanations about debt creation-destruction process.

I do have several questions, which if you don't mind you would explain in more detail. So, from your essay, it can be concluded that the endgame of an exponential debt creation & debt saturation are either a deflationary spiral (Japan & 1929 case) and hyperinflationary depression (Weimar Germany). And according to your essay, the 2 quite opposite paths are determined by the nature of intervention: if debt-paying just involves printing more paper money, it will lead to hyperinflation and if it is channeled through debt, it will end up like Japan.

My questions are:
1. What makes channeling the debt collapse through debt creation -- deflationary? Is it that the debt destruction in the private sector massively outpacing the debt creation (mainly by government)?

2. In Japan, the deflationary spiral is still going. Is this because the government spending is creating more malinvestment and that malinvestment is being liquidated -- hence deflation? The US government under Obama will try similar measures. Do you expect same outcome?

3. Japan had the advantage of high savings rate and boom period in other parts of the world when their credit bust occurred. In light of that, with the present world essentially heavy in debt (including China, who is said to have high savings-rate, although in reality it's printing RMB for incoming USD), what will likely happen, in your view?

4. It looks like the present policy of major economy governments are to devalue their own currencies ("beggar thy neighbor" tactics). What will likely happen? Could the hyperinflationary measure be finally explored? Who has the advantage in this game?

5. Finally.. gold. I feel that the sentiment is too bullish on gold for now for it to be really bullish. I think LT govt bonds (so far still despised) will perform better. Do you agree?

That is all my questions for now. I apologize if the questions are too lengthy. I hope that you can discuss them because they are essential to our outlooks in several years to come.

Thank you for your help & for having been so enlightening.


Best regards,
Roger Jarema
Dear Rodger

Thank you.

I treat a Deflationary Depression and a Hyperinflationary Depression as events in series but a determined government can bypass the Deflationary Depression into a Hyperinflationary Depression, for example Zimbabwe. Your questions are very astute and I deal with them all on a technical level in War on Savings which is with the publishers at present. I will try and publish a pre-publication version on my blog by the 1st week of Jan 2009 if it is still not published at that time. It breaks new ground and as such seems to be in a longer process of evaluation and assessment.

1. An abridged explanation is as follows. Debt Saturation causes the collapse, which occurs when lenders can no longer find willing and able borrowers. Able borrowers are borrowers with financial standing and collateral to support their borrowing. The slowdown in debt formation brings about a collapse of asset bubbles which in turn feeds back into the collapse of debt formation. I do not like the word debt destruction and I am not sure exactly what it is supposed to mean. Debt repayment however is more appropriate as it means that debt previously incurred must now be repaid through an act of saving. Savings imply a sacrifice of income as opposed to the act of taking up debt which is discounting future income. A Government cannot borrow on behalf of taxpayers without creating Stasis (the Japan outcome) or Hyperinflation (the Zimbabwe outcome).

2. The Stasis (Japan) outcome is the activity by a Government to prevent the liquidating of the malinvestments accumulated over many cycles of monetary stimulation. The structural distortions accomplished by such monetary stimulations are not allowed to adjust. Monetary policy is taken to the extreme and fiscal irresponsibility follows thereafter. Still stasis is maintained in a long term economic limbo.


3. There is something of an illusion of a Savings Rate for a country. A population can have a high savings rate while the Government can have a high propensity to utilise those savings (including exchange rate manipulation) which leaves the country with a net savings rate not nearly as impressive. Both Japan and even more so, China are controlled economies. The levels of government intervention are very high and contribute to the achievement of Stasis when the economic distortions are excessive and are not allowed to clear. I favour a non interventionist path and show in War on Savings that such a path though seemingly harsh actually has the least social cost. Governments seem to favour the modern monetary approach a la Japan for Stasis. China is certainly on the same policy platform as Japan. I fear the risk of hyperinflation as it is a choice for currency destruction and severe economic hardship.

4. The Yen Carry trade was actually the proposed (Fed – see Bernanke (1999), Japanese Monetary Policy: A Case of Self-Induced Paralysis) cause of action for a “Beggar thy neighbour” approach and has contributed to the accumulated global structural distortions. Currency devaluation and fiscal irresponsibility has very real potential to initiate a Hyperinflationary spiral. There is only one outright winner – Government. Government gets to hyperinflate away all its debt. Everyone else loses, even those entities who benefits from the debt alleviation through hyperinflation as the economic destruction transfers all the wealth of the country to government. A broken economy and broken currency with government as the single largest economic entity (fascist/socialist nature) will remain afterwards and it will be a fresh start for all but people will literally starve as the production processes of the economy (and globally) will need to be readjusted and rebuilt. It is the democratic version of the collapse of socialism.

5. Gold has its place as a store of value. Gold will probably perform poorly in the Stasis period but any risks of a Hyperinflationary event will boost the demand for and the price for gold into the stratosphere. Own Government Bonds will yield a positive real rate of return (even with a zero interest rate) in the event of deflation and Stasis with default risk contained but will be worthless pieces of paper in the event of a Hyperinflationary depression.

In War on Savings I find that we stand globally before 3 choices – (i) Liquidation and pay for the sins of Debt with the least social cost, (ii) Stasis and we follow a long term downward spiral hoping for external events (say a few new technological advances) to allow us an escape from Stasis in time and to pay for our Debt sins in say new technologies (middle outcome) and, (iii) chose Hyperinflation and start all over in chaos and suffering (worst outcome).

Anonymous said...

Dear Sarel,


Thank you for your great explanations on the topic. It answers clearly many questions I have had for a while. I also eagerly look forward to your “War on Savings” article. I hope that I can find more insightful technical details.

Just a little bit more technical details, I have recently read 2 books by Murray Rothbard. What I can infer from the interventions is that the governments are using liquidity (demand for money) measures to solve a time-preference problems. According to Rothbard, these two are completely unrelated. “… the savings-investment-consumption proportions are determined by time preferences of individuals; the spending-cash balance proportion is determined by their demands for money.” [pg. 39, America’s Great Depression by MN Rothbard).

Basically the government interventions are Keynesian measures to stimulate spending. A situation like now is what they (Keynesians) describe as “liquidity trap”. So, I guess my main question to you in the previous post is whether liquidity measures, taken to the very extremes, can finally bear impact on time preferences. And from what you said, the answer is that it can, but only through chaos & economic system collapse (hyperinflationary depression). Am I interpreting you correctly on this?

As for the turn from Stasis to Hyperinflation, how is the anatomy? Is it an abrupt change (directly to a very aggressive inflation state) or more gradual (low inflation, moderate, then very aggressive inflation), perhaps?

I really hope that I don’t bother you with these questions. It’s kind of long again.

Thank you again for your help and insightful answers.

Kind regards,
Roger

Sarel Oberholster said...

Dear Rodger

War on Savings is a 70 page working paper with full technical details. Your questions are insightful and similar to the questions that I have been wrestling with for the past 8 years. The answers to your questions are in War on Savings and as the answers are somewhat complex and requires some economic theory adjustment (particularly Keynes and the principle that I=S), I would ask to please bear with me while I complete the process with the publishers which have been on-going for the past 3 weeks. Alternatively I will Blog “War on Savings” after 7 January 2009 as a pre-published version. Here is a snipped:

“War on Savings – Modern Monetary Policy Deficiencies Exposed.

“The great inflations of our age are not acts of God. They are man-made or, to say it bluntly, government-made. They are the offshoots of doctrines that ascribe to governments the magic power of creating wealth out of nothing and of making people happy by raising the "national income”."
Foreword by Murray N. Rothbard to The Theory of Money and Credit - Mises, Ludwig von (1881-1973).


1 Introduction

The war upon Savings is an ancient one. Even the alchemic desire of turning lead to gold was part of this war. Saving is a sacrifice. Savings can be stolen, plundered but most of all used to protect against the ravishes of fate. Savings and the vessels of Savings have been lusted after since the production of the very first economic surplus. The inventions of deceit to dispossess Savings have no match in any other human endeavour. Wars were fought with it and over it. Everybody wanted some but not all were prepared to gather it the hard way.

Japan was the focus of my research when I set out on this journey of discovery. The Japanese economic miracle turning into a disaster of systemic failure needed to be understood. The reason for the research became more compelling with the advent of the global financial crisis in 2007.

The Austrian School of economic thought was going to be important for my research but a rigorous drive into economic theorising took me to the heart of Austrian economics.”

I deal specifically with the Liquidity trap (which requires the I=S precondition). I would have to reproduce my whole working paper to answer your questions (you are surely aware that your questions are not of the garden variety type) so 3 weeks should not be a burden to wait for answers.

You can also read “Economic Accounting” (October) or “Praxeology of Commodity Repricing” (August) (http://sareloberholster.blogspot.com/2008/08/praxeology-of-commodity-repricing.html) for an explanation of how the monetary stimulation impacts on the production surplus of an economy.

Monetary Policy actually does not solve any “time preference problems” (a faulty Keynesian construct), and has devastating negative economic effects through the creation of liquidity posing as artificial savings and creating boom/bust economic cycles.

I promise to answer any questions remaining (if I can, it’s a big promise) after you’ve read War on Savings. Your questions are welcome.

Kind regards,
Sarel Oberholster

Anonymous said...

Thank you again for your kindly reply, Sarel.

I will definitely wait for your "War on Savings" papers to come out. It has been quite a journey for me to find the answers, too.

I admit it's very difficult to find these kinds of answers anywhere. First is because my questions mostly deal with Austrian economics school of thought, which is not mainstream. Second is because I could not find an Austrian economics literature dealing with this issue intimately enough (the ones being closest are the Rothbard works I mentioned). And third is because it's even harder to find an Austrian economist dealing closely with the issue.

I'm glad that after quite a while, I have found many of my questions answered. I hope that "War on Savings" will complete those answers and maybe more.

I am certainly thankful for these and I know that it must have been a very satisfying intellectual journey for you too.


Kind regards,
Roger